90¢

Anarchism and Formal Organizations

STUART LEEDS

RESEARCH GROUP ONE

No. 23

Anarchism and Formal Organizations

HOWARD J.
EHRLICH

Some
Notes
on the
Sociological
Study of
Organizations
from an
Anarchist
Perspective

A PREFATORY NOTE

The study of human social organization is central to both academic sociology and anarchist theory. American sociology, however, is explicitly a capitalist enterprise; and it has never recognized anarchism or anarchist theory. Critical analyses of sociology conducted by its marxist critics have also ignored anarchist principles, but at the same time these critiques have also ignored the sociology of organizations.

Why bother to develop a formal critique? What political purposes are served by it? Let me answer in two ways. Firstly, we should examine what the consequences of the sociology of organization can be. To begin with, it presents a view of human organizations that is less than what organizations could be. In the process sociologists legitimate what is and, I think, contribute to people's alienation and cynicism about the character of organization. It suppresses people's thinking about alternatives, and it promotes individualistic solutions and escape.

It is important to understand that sociology and the other social sciences are socially recognized as legitimate--in fact, preferred--modes of social inquiry. Quite obviously my claims based on my being a sociological theorist will arouse far more positive response in most circles than my claims to being an anarchist theorist. Anarchism is a political ideology and is therefore to be distrusted. Sociology, however, is a scientific discipline and warrants your trust.

In actual practice, social scientists regularly introduce ideological statements under the guise of presenting an objective analysis. Since most of the time this happens without scientists knowing they have done so, it is understandable that most people without formal analytic training are also misled. And so political assertions clothed as scientific claims come to be accepted, while naked political claims confront an often embarrassed or indignant audience.

Secondly, the social sciences do differ from other sciences. Social science is reflexive. That is to say people can and do read social science materials; and they can and do act upon what they read. The social sciences do not just discover laws or organize knowledge, they also create it.

Those familiar with the state of the social sciences would not be surprised to learn that there is no singular definition of "organizations" nor any consensual scheme for their classification. Just the same social scientists know what an organization is, and a mass of data on their structure and operation has been accumulated. The arrangement of these data is, of course, dependent on the formal or implicit theory of the scientist. There is, however, a paradigm for organizational sociology that is consensual. For example, almost all organizational theorists accept "control" as a core concept in their theory. They see organizational authority as legitimate, non-coercive, and fundamentally rational. They view leadership and hierarchy as inescapable, if not actually desirable. There are more such paradigmatic statements, to be sure, and we will discuss them as we go along.

The character of this paradigm is essentially authoritarian. Theorists do range across a narrow spectrum. On the right are those who explicitly advocate maximizing control as the means of increasing organizational effectiveness (Price, 1968); and, just a step over the center are those who see bureaucracy as the superior mode of organization and the best designed to protect the rights of individuals (Perrow, 1972).

American sociologists of organization are also capitalists. That is, they accept the idea of profit and the accumulation of capital, of the private ownership of organizations, and of mass production and mass consumption. Certainly statements about the political economy almost never directly enter organizational theories. Nevertheless, as I shall try to show, these theories are built upon, and in turn buttress, the ideology of capitalism.

It would be almost totally unprecedented
for an anarchist analysis to omit the state, how-
ever defined. Similarly, it is almost totally
unprecedented for an organizational theorist to
include the state. Theodore Caplow's *Principles
of Organization* presents one of those rare state-
ments by an academic sociologist:

> In modern society, almost all offical or-
> ganizations turn out, on close inspection,
> to be ultimately authorized by the state,
> which licenses marriages, charters corpor-
> ations, and registers voluntary associations.
> There appear to be two reasons for this phe-
> nomenon. First, property cannot be securely
> held without the sanction of the state. Since
> official organizations of any consequence
> have collective property, it is evident why
> they require authorization. Second, any or-
> ganization that wields substantial power must
> occasionally resort to violence. In modern
> society, in which the state's monopoly of
> violence is nearly unquestioned, the state
> must usually provide the means of coercion
> for private organizations, although there
> are exceptions, such as criminal syndicates.
> The phenomenon of authorization is often
> overlooked. It may seem implausible that
> the memorandum establishing a new janitor
> crew in a branch factory of a manufacturing
> corporation is authorized ultimately by the
> state, but the state *does* confer the corporate
> charter from which the company's board of
> directors derives its right to appoint the
> executives who are entitled to do such things
> as hiring a new janitor crew   (Caplow, 1964,
> p. 23).

Despite that solid beginning, the state never
again appears in his "principles of organization."

There is no concrete theory of anarchist or-
ganization, nor is there an anarchist sociology.
What there is, rather, are numerous stipulations
of how organizations ought to be structured. An-
archists have indicated a clear preference for
small organizations where social relationships
may be personalized and spontaneity in behavior
maximized.

The preference for small size should not be
mistaken for a rigid organizational principle.
It is, rather, an expression of beliefs that (1)
the size of an organization should not exceed
the comprehension of the persons who make it up,
and (2) the size should not exceed the point at
which social relationships become impersonalized.
Since that critical size will vary as people
gain experience in anarchist collectives, it is
premature to talk about the optimum size of an-
archist organizations. For now, I think the
simple preference for smallness is sound.

The fulcrum of anarchist organizational
thought is the principle of the diffusion of pow-
er. Derived from the fundamental belief in human
equality, this principle has been expressed in a
variety of ways when applied to social organiza-
tions. Primary has been a model of equal partic-
ipation in decision-making; that is, collective
decision-making.

More radical, I think, is the conception
that organizations be designed as impermanent,
that is, actually be abolished at intervals. This
idea of organizational impermanence is exploratory.
It originates from many considerations: (a) the
idea that an organization be socially useful and
that its members disband when it is no longer of
utility; (b) the idea that organizations are often
formed to solve particular problems and that they
are no longer necessary when the problems have
been resolved; (c) the idea that the rigidification

of behavior in an organization may be inescapable; and (d) the idea that over time people tend to identify organizational interests with their personal needs. In short, the principle of a temporary organization represents an attempt to prevent or to avoid the pathologies of organizations as we know them today. As we proceed in this essay, other anarchist principles should become more apparent.

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Caplow provides us with a model sociological view of an organization:

An organization is a social system that has an unequivocal collective identity, an exact roster of members, a program of activity, and procedures for replacing members (p. 1).

Contrast this with Drabek and Haas (1974): "Organizations, then, are *relatively permanent and relatively complex interaction systems*" (p. 41, italics in original). Now there are many formal, theoretical reasons why Caplow's definition is sound and this one is not. But that's not our immediate concern. What is of concern is that Drabek and Haas would exclude from consideration virtually all organizational forms that an anarchist would take to be central to community life.

5

There are some anarchists who would object even to Caplow's model sociological definition. For them, the very character of organizations would be different in an anarchist society. Anarchist organizations would be the assembly of people who came together in time and place for specific activities. What we call an organization, they would call "freespace." There would be no membership roster and certainly no formal procedures for the replacement of members. Basically, the freespacers would argue, anyone could "join." The space would be open to all of those who sincerely accepted the agenda of those already engaged in the group's activities. Problems of the usurpation of the space would presumably be minimal in a freespace society.

The freespace idea is not fully developed. It ignores conflict and it skirts reductionism (i.e., of reducing social relations to matters of individual psychology). Nevertheless, it is a radical organizational model, and some present-day anarchists are attempting to work in freespace.

6

The "effectiveness" of an organization has been defined "as the degree of goal achievement" (Price, 1968; Etzioni, 1964). An organization's goals are presumably what the organization through its policy makers is trying to do. To study effectiveness, sociologists will generally examine the written goals of organizations as well as interview or observe those in leadership positions. All of this is very straightforward, and certainly sounds reasonable.

Price in his inventory of research on organizational effectiveness provides us with a reasonable illustration. "For example, a prison which has a custodial goal, and which has a low escape rate among its inmates, would be considered an effective organization" (p. 3). And another: "The successful strike indicates low

degrees of morale, conformity, and effectiveness"
(p. 143, slightly removed from context). Now you
may want to argue that you are opposed to prisons
and certainly to custodial goals. As an anarchist
you certainly would take that position, but the
logical correctness of Price's illustration is un-
impeached. Similarly, you may view a worker's
strike as representing the high morale and cooper-
ative effort of an effective union. But the def-
inition is written from the perspective of the
bosses and not the workers.

As a supposedly neutral sociologist, Price
could have said that judgments of organizational
effectiveness depend on one's social position.
(Having said that he could have even written the
same book by adding the qualification that he
was only writing from a management perspective.)
He didn't do this--not that it really would have
made him neutral--and in not qualifying his in-
ventory, he leaves us with an elitist and dis-
torted view of organizational behavior.

The anarchist conceptualization of organiza-
tional effectiveness requires additional consid-
erations: Who set the goals and what are their
social consequences? And so an organization
would be defined as effective to the degree to
which all of its participants were involved in
formulating its goals, to the degree to which
its goals did not contribute to human discomfort,
and to the degree that it achieved those goals.

7

Organizations work because management has
power. Its power is stable because it is accept-
ed by everyone as legitimate (moral, right, cor-
rect, true, all of the above). Although sociol-
ogists seldom state it openly, they assume that
persons who own or manage an organization have
the right to dispose of their property as they

choose. Those who control the organization con-
tract with workers for their labor. The major
conditions of that contract are dictated by the
owners in the context of the scarcity of jobs
and some regulation by the state. Unions are
scarcely 100 years old, and minimum wage, fair
employment practices, and health and safety reg-
ulations all represent fairly modern innovations
in which the liberal state has restricted the
nature of the contract.

"All power to the board of directors!"

The intervention of the state has added to
the legitimacy of the capitalist's power. And
this is partly because the state is presumed to
be an entity independent of those who control
the workplace. Organizational authority is exer-
cised in the workplace through the legitimacy of
ownership and under the protection of government.

Today, the character of that authority--and
sociologists love to recite their Weberian cate-
chism--is "rational-legal." As Drabek and Haas
put it: "It is legal in the sense that it stems
from a set of written rules and rational in that
compliance is thought to achieve valued ends"
(p. 13).

In the modern organization where authority is presumptively rational but certainly legal, people know how to behave. The defining characteristic of rational-legal authority is that proper behavior is circumscribed by written rules.

> Through these rules, specific jobs or tasks are identified for individuals, groups of individuals, and the entire collectivity. The general purposes, goals, missions, or products of the organization, and subunits within, are specified. And there is a division of labor....All of these individuals, each involved in diverse activities, must be coordinated and controlled in some way (p. 15).

Coordination and control are the recurrent themes of all organizational theory. Certainly no anarchist would object to a call for coordination. What about control? Control, in this context, refers to the control of the decision-making processes--who decides what to do?

For the anarchist, there is no simple solution. What I will call the *minimalist* solution is the position that control can never be held by an elite. That is, it would be unacceptable for some set of people to be able always, or almost always, to control the outcome of decisions.

Now the organizational theorist might reply that the essence of legal-rational authority is that the power to control decisions resides in positions and roles, not people. What that means to the social scientist is something like this: People are recruited to positions because they have satisfied some qualifying criteria and they can remain only as long as they perform their roles competently. Of course the anarchist response to that should be "Bullshit!" It is unlikely that organizations ever worked that way, and it probably represents nothing less than the social scientist's shaping of reality for the convenience of a neat theoretical package.

But the appeal to a "role theory" could be countered on its own. That is, a proper anarchist response is that it makes no difference to have power invested in positions. And there are three quite different reasons why this is so.

First, insofar as we are talking about a work organization within a capitalist society, the decisions controlled by persons in positions of authority must be constrained by the objective of maximizing profit. This is, after all, *the* criterion of effectiveness in a capitalist organization. Thus all decisions must rationally be biased against the workers.

Elitist decision-making in a work organization within a state socialist society must also be constrained by objectives that do not necessarily correspond with those of the workers in a given organization. To be sure the likelihood of correspondence is greater under socialism and, in some states, worker involvement in determining objectives is greater. Nevertheless, state interests are generally nonnegotiable and, to that degree, will also be biased against the workers. (In the classic Marxist-Leninist formulation, only when the dictatorship of the proletariat is established will the interests of the state be identical with those of the workers. Needless to say no anarchist expects that to happen; nor for that matter do many sociologists. But that of course is another can of theoretical worms.)

There is a second objection to the idea of power and authority being appropriate to certain positions within an organization. In modern capitalist and socialist societies, work is organized into occupational careers. A career is typically defined as some progression of jobs in the same domain, with the implication that each new job or position entails increases in responsibility and usually authority as well as increases in wages or other compensation. Now most workers are tracked. They don't have careers, or they have careers that are highly limited in the span

of increased income or responsibility. In fact, the conception of careers is popularly reserved to professionals and to managers.

Few persons ever get to occupy positions of power. Partly this is a consequence of the differential life chances associated with class position, sex, and ethnicity in modern society; and partly this is a consequence of the limited number of positions of power in society. (Neither of these consequences are invariant, even in a capitalist society.) While social scientists are divided in their attitudes about the necessities of class, they do seem to be in accord that positions of power are scarce and that this is the way things ought to be.

So it is that a small set of the total population holds careers that permit them to move across positions of power. So acceptable is the idea of such a career that colleges and organizations provide some people with the option to train in administration; that is, to acquire certain resources of power and knowledge of their use. Careerists in power inevitably acquire further resources of organizational knowledge as well as administrative skills that only come with actual role performance. Thus access to organizational power resources typically has a cumulative effect.

That people can make a career of managing the lives of others is patently unacceptable within an anarchist framework. However, still within the framework of a minimalist solution, the anarchist could accept the idea of the scarcity of positions of power. There would be an obvious set of qualifications to that acceptance, namely, that this scarcity is neither desirable nor inevitable nor would it be allowed to persist. In keeping with those qualifications, the minimalist program would require that no one be permitted to make a career of positions of power. Put positively, people would rotate through such positions, and tenure would be highly limited. The consequence of this program

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would diffuse organizational and administrative knowledge.

There is, finally, a third objection to allocating power to positions which are held in limited number. Freedom is not just a matter of social structure, it is also a habit. The concentration of power makes followers of us all. We not only do not have the opportunities to learn how to act autonomously, we are constantly rehearsing our repertory of compliance, passivity, and subordination. Having removed the constraints of oppressive institutions doesn't automatically free people. That comes only with a practice now denied to most people.

8

There is a basic premise in organizational sociology that the centralization of decision-making is a requisite of good organizations. This premise sustains the intellectual's distrust of the intentions and capabilities of most people.

Strategic decisions must be concentrated at a single place if the organization is to attain a high degree of effectiveness. This concentration may involve either a single individual, or a group of individuals... what is imperative is that the making of strategic decisions be concentrated at a single place in the organization (Price, 1968, p. 81).

In his inventory of research, Price distinguishes two types of decisions. There are the long-term decisions, mainly concerned with goals and policy-making. These are the *strategic* decisions. *Tactical* decisions are those which are mainly administrative, and these are the routine, day-to-day operational decisions. With regard to both types, Price concludes that centralization—the concentration of decision-making power—is the

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key to effectiveness. Organizations that have a greater concentration of power in *both* strategic and tactical decision-making, he concludes, will be more effective than those which have a lower concentration of power.

Within the confines of his capitalist criterion of effectiveness, it is likely that Price's conclusions are true as empirical generalizations. Without accepting that criterion, we could pose the question of whether the rotation of persons through positions of power in highly centralized organizations would modify organizational effectiveness. And the answer is that there is normal turnover in managerial positions without long-term consequences. Such rotation does not have any inescapably negative impact on organizational effectiveness.

A final note: Price's conclusions do not necessarily imply that the most effective organizations are those directed by a small group of individuals. But in the context of his monograph, and in the absence of a disclaimer, I think that is the inference most people would derive. Within the context of this society it may, in fact, be a valid inference. If so, its validity must be regarded by the anarchist as an index of the failure of present-day organizational forms.

9

Since Max Weber wrote the first, now classical, sociological defense of bureaucracy as the form of organization most suited to capitalism, there have been few serious challenges to the belief in the necessity of bureaucratic forms. And the rationalizations for it seem never to end:

> Critics, then, of our organizational society, whether they are the hippies of the New Left emphasizing spontaneity and freedom,

the new radical right demanding their own form of radical decentralization, or the liberals in between speaking of the inability of organizations to be responsive to community values, had best turn to the key issue of who controls the varied forms of power generated by organizations rather than flail away at the windmills of bureaucracy. If we want our material civilization to continue as it is, we will have to have large-scale bureaucratic enterprises in the economic, social, and governmental areas. This is the most efficient way to get the routine work of a society done (Perrow, 1972, p. 58).

There are four essential components of a bureaucratic organization that concern us here. (1) There is a hierarchy of positions; (2) there is a specialized division of labor; (3) salaries and other rewards are distributed according to rank in the hierarchy; and (4) there are formal rules and procedures regulating organizational behavior.

It is my belief that bureaucracies are defended more because of the societal effects that social scientists *do not talk about* than because of their supposed efficiency as an organizational form. These four components may be necessary for a bureaucracy, but they are also necessary to maintain class stratification, to promote ideas of social mobility and competition, to preclude self-management and foster separatism and isolation. Bureaucratic forms--worst of all--deny people opportunities for growth and self-development; and they perpetuate a political-economic standard of self-assessment--"if you're so smart, how come you're not rich."

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Bureaucratic forms in state socialist societies have the same social consequences; that is,

they are also supportive of the political economy. While collective goals, cooperation and comradeship are emphasized, hierarchy and specialization persist. In some state socialist settings, there has been a serious attempt at minimizing income differences and involving workers in larger organizational decisions. And one should not overlook the guarantees of employment, of housing and health care--guarantees that certainly make the life circumstances of people more secure. Just the same, the secure worker in the socialist organization is no more autonomous, no more independent, and no more free than workers in capitalist organizations.

Subordination to authority, indoctrination in the ideological justifications for hierarchy and differences in knowledge and access to information, and the lack of freedom to make basic decisions about one's life--all of these can foster in both the capitalist and socialist worker their dependence on others and a lack of self-respect.

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We learn to identify authority and power early. The nuclear family with its age and sex-based division of labor and power is the initial training ground. The school with its demands for regimentation, for discipline, and the acceptance of the teacher as authority becomes the second level of indoctrination. Autonomy, being in charge of one's self, is not in the teacher syllabus of most public schools.

Matriculating to the workplace, most young people have already adapted to authoritarian institutions. While people are well-socialized to follow orders, they are seldom engaged in the learning of modes of autonomous behavior. More likely, they have learned neither to trust nor to like themselves. Psychologically, the two go

together; authoritarian acceptance and self-rejection are reciprocating characteristics of personality. Sociologically, they are necessary conditions for conforming behavior.

Everyday life in most work organizations is stultifying. Rarely is there an opportunity to conceptualize anything better. So one does what one has to do. And by going about one's work, people re-affirm their negative self-conceptions and re-validate the organizational form as something positive.

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In an extraordinary collection of political sociological essays directed at a defense of liberalism, Barrington Moore attacks the left, anarchists and neo-marxists, for wanting people to share in decisions. "A very precious part of human freedom is that *not* to make decisions" (Moore, 1973, p. 69). Mr. Moore, contemplating his future oppression in political forums presumably in contrast to his present freedom as a Harvard professor, neglects one critical point. There is at least one universal act which is "forbidden" in anarchy as it is in all humane forms of social organization. People are not free to give up their freedom.

Moore himself recognizes that some decisions are routinized and need not be reviewed constantly, such as whether to drive on the left or right hand side of the road.

All that matters is that there should be *some* decision. In others [areas of life] the problem is simply to get the right decision according to some easily agreed upon criterion. In such areas it is possible to formulate standards of competence about ways to make the decision, and, with considerably greater difficulty, find ways to enforce them. In still other areas of life it may be impossible to persuade people to accept clear criteria that distinguish between good and bad decisions (p. 69).

Unlike most social scientists who seldom examine their own politics, Moore is quite self-consciously and explicitly antagonistic to anarchism (see particularly pp. 72-76). Even in this brief passage one can discern his elitist orientation in his concern with persuasion and enforcement. It is clear that Moore casts out these observations to indicate the absurdity of total participation. But on that point, I suspect, most anarchists would agree. For the problem remains for Moore's unrealized liberal democratic state just as it does for anarchy: Is there an optimum level of participation? And that problem, I maintain, will be solved through social practice-- and long years of wrong decisions.

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Even an optimum level of participation would not in and of itself mean:

(a) the right decision will be made;

(b) the decision will be less arbitrary than one made by a single person;

(c) that no one will necessarily suffer as a result.

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By itself, no system of decision-making can guarantee social justice. It is a tenet of anarchist theory that social justice is more likely to be obtained through optimizing the participation of the members of an organization or community.

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
Anarchy is not without leadership. It is without followership. Anarchists do not deny that a person may be *an* authority about some technical or practical or intellectual matter. Anarchists do deny that a person may be *in* authority. An authority may extend leadership in the matter in which s/he is authoritative. But such leadership can never be coercive.

Leadership under anarchism has two other characteristics that leadership in authoritarian organizations does not have. First, it is exercised within an egalitarian framework; that is, it is based not on the presumption that the leader is a superior person but on the presumption that the leader knows more about the subject for which s/he is providing leadership. Second, leadership is exercised within an educative framework. Anarchist leaders attempt to influence outcomes through education, not through issuing directives.

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Sociologists have never been able to fathom "voluntary associations." As someone who reviewed the literature and proposed a new classificatory scheme a number of years ago, I think--in retrospect--that scientists have been intellectually fascinated but confused by the subject. "Voluntary associations" in the sociologist's special language are those everyday groupings such as garden clubs and civic associations, tenant's unions and softball teams, self-help groups and that ever-present display of animal clubs like the Lions, Elks, Eagles, etc. Organizational theorists typically treat these voluntary associations as something different from the other organizations they study. Why is that? I think it is because it doesn't correspond with a strictly capitalist model of work nor an organizational theorist's model of control.

Drabek and Haas ask with no embarrassment, "Since member participation isn't based on wage and salary payment, how is it that participation exists at all?" (p. 61). How can they explain such puzzling behavior? *Boredom*. Membership helps "avoid boredom." There are, the authors mention, "activities" and "symbolic rewards... promoting participation" (p. 62), but they leave the impression that they view the whole thing with disbelief. Voluntary association membership, they imply, is transitory--a phenomenon stemming from the fickleness of bored people and the absence of a "high degree of boundary control." What that means is that people "may enter and exit with relative ease" (p. 62).

Now I know of no evidence indicating that membership in voluntary associations is any more or less transitory than residence or place of employment, and the authors cite no evidence. I also know of no evidence that would permit a sociologist to assert what the average life span of such associations is or was in a given time or

place. But should associations live forever? Should any organization be permanent? Or is longevity a built-in value premise of organizational theorists?

We do know, for example, in the United States alone 30-40 thousand formal business organizations fail each year, if we take bankruptcy as a criterion. And thousands more simply close down for a variety of other reasons. Organizational theorists seem to be rather unconcerned about these. This is, presumably, the natural outcome of a market economy. And what sociologists study are the survivors of organizational competition. Thus, permanence appears to be an issue only with regard to voluntary associations.

Voluntary associations are viewed also as relatively more ineffective than formal organizations: "The nature of most voluntary organizations means that it is more difficult to mobilize them for unusual and sustained action" (p. 62). Why is that? Because "the notion of command and control by top management is unusual in these organizations" (p. 62).

In case the premises underlying the Drabek-Haas analysis are not clear, let me state them directly. First, the primary incentive for organizational participation is money. Second, in addition, effective participation requires some form of entrance exam and some obstacles to leaving that are built into the organizational structure. Finally, effective organizations have a central command and control unit that can require sustained action on the part of its membership.

Another general critique of voluntary associations, and one that appears in most texts, is that they become more formal over time. That is, they become larger, develop a division of labor, a hierarchy, a paid staff, routine procedures, and so on. This ostensibly simple, non-controversial generalization, in fact, masks a

complex of ideological presuppositions.

To begin with, the statement is probably neither entirely true nor false. Some associations have grown and become formalized, and some have not. Why make a point about those that have? I think that there is a good reason why sociologists do so. If voluntary associations become formal organizations, and if this is construed as a natural tendency, then they no longer constitute an intellectual problem. That is, they either die or become formalized. Now this may not be good theory or rigorous science, but it is a way of writing off a social phenomenon that does not easily fit the political economics of organizational thought.

Organizations that expand and move to paid positions are surely by conventional criteria a "success." On the other hand the anarchist critic would argue that becoming larger, expanding specialization of the membership, and even hiring a paid staff may well be erroneous decisions; and that these are indicators of failure. For the anarchist organizer, one criterion of success might be that the membership help other people organize their own voluntary associations. For example, instead of becoming larger, the membership would limit itself but assist others in building their own autonomous associations.

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People who work "together" in large formal

organizations sometimes have difficulty in recognizing their co-workers in other contexts. They are frequently surprised at discovering that people they have worked with for years have "hidden" interests and talents; that they are real people. The regulation of behavior in the workplace is designed to suppress genuine personal relations. For the manager, this ostensibly increases people's work time and productivity. It also decreases the likelihood of worker solidarity.

People have to learn how not to be sociable, starting with the extraordinary efforts of many parents in teaching children to avoid strangers. At the adult level, privacy becomes the symbolic reward for achievement. At higher levels of achievement, it may mean one's own toilet bowl in one's own lavatory in one's own office. Eventually, a stove, refrigerator, bar, and bed and the top executive need never have an accidentally non-private moment in her or his corporate life.

There may be a fine line between privacy and isolation. But the sociologist of organizations is not the one to sketch it in. For most workers there is no privacy, only isolation. For most sociologists there is little isolation, only the rewards of privacy.

Persons may work in the same organization, indeed on the same substage for a period of years and remain strangers to one another if they so choose. But as inhuman and undesirable as this may seem at first, think of the freedom it provides. You may not wish to become acquainted with everyone. Thus, not only do such arrangements afford greater efficiency, they greatly extend the limits of personal privacy (Drabek and Haas, 1974, p. 16).

If there is any singular flaw in that statement, it is this: People in formal organizations are seldom free to choose *not* to remain strangers.

The discipline of a workforce has its roots in personal self-denial. Play is subversive to formal organizations.

Organizational sociologists don't like to talk about it. It has defied social theorists, and its occurrences are not predictable. There is no room for play in the theories of formal organization. Drabek and Haas actually mention the issue, devoting slightly less than a page to it--which is more than is presented by most of their colleagues. Their concern is business-like and very sociologistic: "Spontaneity of interaction is largely curtailed within any organization" (p. 100).

As a revolutionary tactic, the anarchist advocates the introduction of play into all formal organizations. As a component of anarchist theory, the relation of work and play is an unresolved equation. As the meaning of work becomes transformed in the process of building anarchist organizations, so the relation of work and play will be changed. These initial theoretical principles would probably be contained in an anarchist theory. Work becomes play to the extent that:

-it is not a matter of survival, or otherwise coercive

-it is not producing commodities primarily to be exchanged for something else

-the conditions and process of work are controllable by the worker

-it is intrinsically satisfying.

(the beginning)

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